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PANEL III
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT AND
THE RISE OF TORT
Hon. Robert H. Bork t
INTRODUCTION

The subject for discussion is individual responsibility in the
context of tort law and contract law. However one feels about it,
and I assume there is considerable diversity of opinion among the
panelists, it seems beyond dispute that the law has changed radically
in the past couple of decades. These changes often relieve persons
of obligations they have undertaken. Such changes do not occur in
isolation; changes in judge-made law may reflect strong currents in
the culture. Law reflects those changes and tends to reinforce them.
There will, of course, be resistance to change and when that resistance occurs, we are entitled to call the conflict a cultural war.
It is not clear to me how to describe in a single phrase what is
happening in our legal culture. One thing we are seeing is, as Peter
Huber put it in his book, a move from individual responsibility to
collective responsibility. Nowhere is this more true than in tort law,
and the movement away from individual responsibility may be very
strong in constitutional law as well.

t John M. Olin Scholar in Legal Studies at the American Enterprise Institute of
Public Policy Studies. A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Judge Bork served as Solicitor
General from 1973 to 1977 and as Acting Attorney General of the United States while
on leave from a professorship at Yale Law School. He was a partner in the Washington
office of the law firm Kirkland & Ellis until 1982, when he was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. President Reagan nominated him

to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987. He recently authored The Tempting of America: The
PoliticalSeduction of the Law. Judge Bork is a Trustee of the Federalist Society.
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SOME PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACT
AS PROMISE
Randy E. Barnett t
INTRODUCTION
CONTRACT AS PROMISE

Despite the fond hopes of generations of legal scholars and activists, freely negotiated and enforceable contracts still govern the
bulk of commercial relations in this country-particularly large complex commercial relations as opposed to consumer transactions.
Law professors have to search pretty hard to find appellate cases
that can be touted as harbingers of a contract-free future.
I want to begin this presentation by acknowledging the important role that Allan Farnsworth has played in keeping contract alive.
Professor Farnsworth is without doubt the preeminent living American contracts authority. His principal contributions include the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"),1 for which he was
the reporter, and his masterful treatise on contracts. 2 These two
projects testify to the fact that one person can make a difference in
the development of law; they have been the doctrinal glue holding
the rules and principles of modem contract law together against a
siege of anti-contract ideology coming from academia. Additionally,
I would be unfair to Allan were I to neglect his theoretically insightful law review articles, particularly those concerning contrac3
tual interpretation.
If the goal of this symposium was to hear from two contract law
professors with diametrically opposing views, then I am afraid that
the organizers erred in inviting Professor Farnsworth and myself.
This is not to say, however, that I have no disagreements with Professor Farnsworth. I do. In this essay, I shall try to explain why,
although contract thankfully still lives in practice, the prevailing theory of contract that has been promoted by Professor Farnsworth
and others is deficient in that it leaves contract law vulnerable to
t
Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
2 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (1990).
3 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and PreliminaryAgreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); E. Allan Farnsworth,
"Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE LJ. 939 (1967).
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being undermined in the ways that, for example, Walter Olson de4
scribes in his contribution to this symposium.
In particular, mainstream contract theory is dominated by the
conception of "contract as promise," or what I shall call the promise
theory of contracts. From the Second Restatement to Contract as
Promise5 by Charles Fried, it is widely assumed that the basis of enforcing contracts is related to the obligation one has to keep one's
promises. 6 According to this theory, one looks to the institution of
promising to see why, and therefore when, commitments should be
legally enforceable. This is hardly a new development. The promise theory of contract achieved preeminence through the efforts of
Harvard Law School Professor Samuel Williston in his famous trea8
tise 7 and in the first Restatement of Contracts ("First Restatement").
(You might say that Professor Williston was the Allan Farnsworth of
his day.)
Now I realize that to many the promise theory may seem not
only to be obviously correct, but one cannot immediately imagine
an acceptable alternative to it. Certainly, it seems preferable to the
detrimental reliance theory of contract promoted by those heralding
the "Death of Contract." 9 And I freely admit that the promise theory has its attractions-particularly if one assesses, as I do, the vitality of contract by the extent to which a legal system implements the
classical liberal conception of justice, 0 a central principle of which
is freedom of contract. Freedom of contract has two distinct dimensions: The first-freedom from contract-stipulates that persons
should not have contractual obligations imposed on them without
their consent. The second-freedom to contract-stipulates that
4
See Walter Olson, Tortification of Contract Law: Displacing Consent and Agreement, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1043 (1992).
5

See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-

TION (1981).
6 This does not mean that a promise theory is necessarily a "will theory" which
bases contractual obligation on the promisor's subjective will to be bound. Promises
may also be thought to create obligation because other persons have or are likely to rely
upon them to their detriment. For a discussion of the various theories that have been
advanced to justify contractual obligation, see Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986) (critically evaluating will, reliance, efficiency,
fairness, and bargain theories of contractual obligation).
7
SAMUEL W. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (lst ed. 1920).
8

8 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1928). Williston was the Reporter for the First

Restatement.
9

See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). For a discussion of some

of the difficulties with this theory, see Barnett, supra note 6, at 274-77; Randy E. Barnett
& Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissoy Estoppel, ContractFormalities,and Misrepresentations, 15 HoFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987).
10 I discuss the social function of the liberal conception ofjustice in Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 62
(1992).
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persons should have the power to alter by consent their legal relations.1 The promise theory has been salutary to both aspects of
freedom of contract to some degree.
The promise theory views the origin of contract in the making
of a promise.1 2 This means that it views the creation of contracts as
arising, in an important part, from the voluntary acts of promisors
rather than from third parties like the State. In this regard, the theory facilitates the classical liberal value of freedom to contract. The
promise theory also supports the notion that contracts should be
interpreted according to the terms of the promise rather than by
imposing terms on the parties. In this regard, the theory facilitates
the classical liberal value of freedom from contract. These strengths
of the promise theory are why I credit Professor Farnsworth-one of
the leading proponents of this theory of contract-with helping to
keep contract alive. By promoting the promise theory so effectively,
he has helped bolster both freedom from and freedom to contract.
Yet the promise theory is not without its difficulties, though
these difficulties are complex and hard to explain concisely. With
this caveat in mind, however, and at the risk of substantial oversimplification, I shall attempt to summarize some of the problems that
arise from adhering to a promise theory of contract.
I
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE PROMISE THEORY OF
CONTRACT

Serious problems with the promise theory begin the moment
we seek a rationale for enforcing promises. The problem for which
the promise theory is supposed to be the solution is to figure out
exactly why it is that contracts are legally enforceable (and, therefore, which commitments should be enforced). That is, we are concerned, not with why persons ought to keep their word, but with
why and therefore when coercion may be used by third parties, including the State, to compel promisors either to perform or pay
damages when they fail to keep their word. The best-known answers to the question of legal enforceability provided by the promise theory are often either highly moralistic or tort-like in nature.
11 For a discussion of these principles and the important social functions they perform, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821 (1992).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 11, at 4
("[T]he law of contracts is confined to promises.") (emphasis added).
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Professor Fried, for example, has argued that the obligation to
keep one's promises is a moral one:
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he
has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give
grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that
confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared
social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.13
But a moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have
courts enforcing purely moral commitments, which is tantamount to
legislating virtue. Such an open-ended rationale leads to serious
problems for the value of freedom of contract. First, it commits
courts to enforcing promissory commitments that the parties themselves may never have contemplated as "contractual" or legally enforceable, thereby undermining the value of freedom from contract.
Second, once the moral behavior of the promissor is deemed relevant to the issue of enforceability, the promise theory also appears
to make relevant to the issue of enforcement other moral aspects of
the promisor's behavior that may argue against enforcement,
thereby undermining the value of freedom to contract. In this manner, the common-law rights of contract can come to resemble the
judicial discretion of a court of equity.
Another popular justification of the promise theory looks at the
promise from the direction of the promisee. That is, persons may
be compelled to perform or pay damages because others have relied
or are likely to rely upon a promise to their detriment. t4 This was
the rationale for contract law apparently favored by Fuller and Perdue in their famous article The Reliance Interest in ContractDamagesi5__
although, as evidenced by his later article, Considerationand Form, 16
Lon Fuller himself never took an injurious reliance theory as far as
the many subsequent law professors who so admire his earlier pathbreaking work. When the enforceability of promises is justified in
this way the promise theory is but a short step away from a detrimental reliance theory. That is, once the injury suffered by the
promisee is made the principal rationale for enforcing promises, we
FRIED, supra note 5, at 16 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicialMethod, 97 Ht-Rv. L. REV.
678 (1984);Jay M. Feinman, The Meaningof Reliance: A HistoricalPerspective, 1984 Wis. L.
13

14

REV. 1373.
15 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 46

L.J. 373 (1936-1937).
Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). In this article, Fuller makes clear that he considers private autonomy to be a vital part of any complete account of contractual obligation.
YALE
16
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end up with the following very tort-like theory of contract: Just as
tort actions compensate persons injured by physical conduct, contract actions compensate persons injured by verbal promissory conduct. In such an approach, either dimension of freedom of contract
plays little, if any, role. In sum, this way of justifying the promise
theory ultimately transforms it into the detrimental reliance theory,
which undermines rather than supports contract as a distinct type of
consensual obligation within the liberal conception ofjustice.
Even the efficiency rationale for the promise theory provided by
law-and-economics scholars creates problems. According to this
view, an exchange of promises (bargains) is enforceable because
both parties are made better off ex ante.17 Sole reliance on this rationale creates two problems. First, it apparently permits promises
to go unenforced whenever it can be shown that factors such as unequal bargaining power or disparities of information undermine the
normal assumption of mutual ex ante gain.1 8 Second, it enables
some to ask why the efficacy of contracts should be assessed according to the ex ante benefits rather than some assessment of ex post fairness of the exchange. Why is the perspective of the parties before
the exchange occurs the most appropriate point in a transaction to
assess whether someone is made better or worse off by an
exchange?
Yet another serious problem for freedom of contract is created
by the promise theory's exclusive focus on promises once it is conceded, as it must be, that many real-world contract law problems
arise precisely because parties have unavoidably left "gaps" in their
promises. Some theorists argue that other nonpromissory principles must be used to determine the "gap-filling" rules of contract
law. 1 9 According to Charles Fried, who takes exactly this position,
where gaps exist in a contract, "the court is forced to sort out the
difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on which these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of the agreement-that is, of contract as
promise." 20 While Fried, perhaps reluctantly, concedes this point,
other theorists who are quite hostile to viewing consent as central to
17
Of course, the law-and-economics analysis of contract is considerably richer and
more complex than this simple proposition. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 79-123 (3d ed. 1986).
18 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The BargainPrincipleand Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV.
741, 750 (1982) ("The argument based on the efficiency of contract price is fully effective only to the extent that the relevant market does not materially differ from a perfectly
competitive market. In fact, however, many contracts are made in markets that are
highly imperfect.").
19 See Barnett, supra note 11.
20
FRIED, supra note 5, at 60.
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contract law-such as relational theorists Ian Macneil 21 and Peter
Linzer 22-exalt in this view.
Perhaps more surprisingly, some law-and-economics scholars
have adopted the same argument. 23 Because the problem of promissory gaps is pervasive, the promise theory implicitly legitimizes a
variety of gap-filling rules based not on the parties' explicit or implicit consent, but on any policy or principle a court or legislature
may happen to prefer. As Richard Craswell has argued, "[d]ebates
over the question of why promises are binding ... do much less
than is commonly supposed to settle the role to be played by efficiency, non-economic values, or ethical theories generally in select24
ing contract law's background rules."
II
SOME ADVANTAGES OF A CONSENT THEORY OF CONTRACT

What alternative is there to the promise theory that can capture
its advantages while avoiding its drawbacks? I favor an updated version of the older view of contract that seeks to distinguish between
enforceable and unenforceable promises by looking to see if the
parties to an agreement manifested their intention to create or alter
their legal relations. According to this approach, the factor that
must accompany a promise and that justifies substantial reliance
upon a promise is the existence of a manifested intention to create legal
relations or, to use another common formulation, a manifested intention
25
to be legally bound.
I have called this the consent theory of contract. 26 According to
a consent theory (and here I simplify the theory considerably),
21

See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contractsand Presentation, 60 VA. L.

REv. 589, 593 (1974) ("When the guise of... consensually formed law was not possible,
...the system filled the gaps by supplying presentation in the form of predictable and
theoretically precise rules."). For a more extensive presentation of Macneil's views of
consent and my critique, see Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming August 1992).
22 See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139; Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?-Replyingto Four
Critics, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 213.
23 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
24 Id. at 528. For my reply to Craswell, see Barnett, supra note 11 at 874-97.
25 Although these two formulations are adequate for most purposes, for reasons

that are beyond the scope of this essay, they are not completely accurate. A more complete expression of the principle would be that contractual obligation arises when a
person "voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights." Barnett, supra note 6, at 300.
26 In addition to the articles already cited, see Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining
Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1992) Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External
Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undis-
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promises and other types of commitments ought to be legally enforceable if they are made in such a way as to convey to a promisee
the message that the promisor intends to be held legally accountable for nonperformance. This message can be conveyed formallyfor example, by a signed waiver of tort liability that is written in a
manner that is intelligible to the person signing it.27 Or it can be
conveyed informally, as done on every commodities exchange in the
world. 28 Regardless of how this message is conveyed, without it a
29
promise does not create an enforceable contractual obligation.
With this message, a promise is presumptively enforceable as a
30
contract.
For example, when I promised Janice Calabresi that I would
take part in this symposium, I certainly did not intend to subject
myself to legal sanctions should I for some reason fail to participate.
Nor do I think that, while she certainly relied on my promise, Janice
could reasonably have believed that I had consented to assume any
contractual obligation to appear. Although she may have judged me
harshly for withdrawing as a participant, both she and I would consider it to be the height of injustice if I were to be sued for breach of
contract. Something more formal or more explicit than our phone
conversation would have had to occur to rebut the normal presumption that a promise to speak is not legally binding on the speaker,
although I have no doubt that there is a court somewhere that
would disagree.
If the promise theorym-whether based on the moral rationale of
promise-keeping, on the rationale of injurious reliance, or on some
other rationale-is the predominant view of the twentieth century,
the consent theory, whose roots go back centuries, was probably the
predominant contract theory of the nineteenth century (although it
is a bit difficult to be sure about this since so much of legal theory in
that period was implicit rather than explicit). The view that Williston needed to argue against and which he and others eventually defeated when they succeeded in making promise-keeping the focal
closed Agency With Contract Theory, CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988); Randy E. Barnett, Contract
Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HAIv. L. REv. 1223 (1984). A

condensed and revised account of this approach appears in Randy E. Barnett, Rights and
Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in LIABILrrY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND MORALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds., 1991).
27 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 310-12.
28 See id. at 312-17. See also Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.
29 However, such conduct could still give rise to legal liability sounding in tort or
restitution, provided the requirements of these types of liability are present.
30 Because consent is only presumptively binding, other circumstances such as duress, fraud, and incapacitation, if established, could rebut the presumption and defeat a
claim for contractual enforcement. See Barnett, supra note 6, at 309-10, 318-19.
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point of contract theory, was stated by Professor Ernest Lorenzen in
1919: "Agreements which are physically possible and legally permissible should, on principle, be enforceable.., if it was the intention of the parties to assume legal relations." 3 1 Williston's triumph
over this view was reflected in section 20 of the First Restatement
which stated that: "neither... the mental assent to the promises in
the contract nor real or apparentintention that the promises shall be legally
binding is essential [to contract formation]." 3 2 This position was
adopted in section 21 of the Second Restatement, which states that
"neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. ....
.,3

By arguing, as I have in my writings on contract, that consenta manifested intention to be legally bound-is the key to distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable promises, I do not mean
to suggest that courts should simply look for this intention unguided by general rules and principles. I suspect that a direct pursuit of these intentions on a case-by-case basis would likely lead to
more injustice from the standpoint of consent than it would avoid.
To the contrary, the bargain requirement of consideration that plays
a pivotal role in both the First and Second Restatements, and which
states that mutually inducing promises are presumptively enforceable, is an excellent, though far from perfect,3 4 criterion of consensual obligation precisely because the existence of a bargain so
frequently corresponds to the existence of a manifested intention to
be legally bound. This means that, in practice, there is often very
little difference between a promise theory as embodied in the Restatement and a consent theory.
Still, an exclusive focus on either bargained-for consideration
or detrimental reliance, or both, as criteria of contractual obligation
creates serious problems of underenforcement and overenforcement. By this I mean a failure to enforce consensual commitments
that should be enforced and the enforcement of commitments to
which the parties did not consent and therefore should not be enforced. The problem of underenforcement is the concern of those
contributors to this symposium, such as Walter Olson, 35 who complain that consensual commitments to waive tort liability and to as31 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE LJ.
621, 646 (1919).

32

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1928) (emphasis added).

33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). This proposition is qualified
somewhat, however, by the further stipulation that "a manifestation of intention that a
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract." Id.
(emphasis added). This may represent a subtle shift in the direction of consent theory.
34 See Barnett, supra note 6, at 287-91; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.
35 See Olson, supra note 4.
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sume greater than normal risks of harm are held to be
unenforceable no matter how demonstrable or knowledgeable may
be the exercise of consent by a person assuming such a risk. In this
manner, the ability of persons to exercise freedom to contract and
avoid the hazards of the tort-law system of negligence is undermined, as Peter Huber and Walter Olson have so graphically de36
scribed in their writings.
Consider for a moment the more neglected problem of the
overenforcement of promises. One famous example of overenforcement engendered, at least in part, by the promise theory of
contract, is the case of Texaco v. Pennzoil.s 7 Texaco was accused of
having tortiously interfered with a contract that allegedly existed between the Getty Foundation and Pennzoil. Texaco argued, in part,
that there was no contract between Getty and Pennzoil for it to interfere with. So, an important issue in the case was whether or not a
contract existed between Getty and Pennzoil.
The Texas Court of Appeals took the view that whether a contract existed or not depended on whether the parties "intended to
be bound" 8s to the agreement they had apparently reached.
Although this formulation sounds like a consent theory standard of
"manifested intention to be legally bound," it could simply be another way of saying that one has made a promise. According to the
Second Restatement, "[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act
or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
39
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."
While I have no quarrel with this definition of a promise, it implies that everyone who makes a promise is "binding" themselves in
some significant sense. Surely, I "bound" myself to come to Washington to give this presentation insofar as I gave Janice Calabresi
reason to believe that I had made a "commitment" to attend, even
though (in my opinion at least) I did not manifest an intention to be
legally bound. Although they never squarely address the matter in
Texaco v. Pennzoil, the Texas trial and appellate courts appear to have
viewed the crucial issue to be whether or not a promise had been
made. They concluded that sufficient evidence of a promise existed
to justify the jury's verdict. If, however, any promise that was made
by Getty to Pennzoil was not apparently intended to be legally bind36 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION ExPLOsION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr (1991).
37 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App. 1987).
38 Id. at 789 ("The issue of when the parties intended to be bound is a fact question
to be decided from the parties' acts and communications.").
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
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ing, then from the perspective of the liberal principle of freedom
from contract, this case is an instance of overenforcement.
Another recent case provides an intriguing example of a court
attempting to use something like a consent theory of contract,
rather than a promise theory, to decide whether a promise should
be enforced and to prevent overenforcement. This is the Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. 40 case, which has become well-known (and was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States) 4 1 because the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that enforcing a promise of confidentiality of a reporter to her source violated the First Amendment.
For present purposes, the more interesting issue in the case is the
contract law issue entirely avoided by the United States Supreme
Court but considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court. This is the
question of whether the promise of confidentiality made by a newspaper reporter to a source was properly enforceable according to
contract law rather than according to the First Amendment. The
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by
observing:
A contract, it is said, consists of an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. Here, we seemingly have all three, plus a breach.
We think, however, the matter is not this simple.
Unquestionably, the promises given in this case were intended by the promisors to be kept....
The question before us, however, is not whether keeping a
confidential promise is ethically required but whether it is legally
enforceable; whether, in other words, the law should superimpose
a legal obligation on a moral and ethical
obligation. The two obli42
gations are not always coextensive.
After noting that "in this case.., we have a clear-cut promthe Minnesota Supreme Court went on to offer a consent theory rationale for nonenforcement:

ise,"' 43

The law ... does not create a contract where the parties intended none .... Nor does the law consider binding every ex-

change of promises.... We are not persuaded that in the special
milieu of media newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily
believe that they are engaged in making a legally binding contract.
They are not thinking in terms of offers and acceptances in any
commercial or business sense. The parties understand that the

40
41
42
43

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990).
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
457 N.W.2d at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
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reporter's promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment,
but a moral obligation alone will not support a contract .... 44
The court then concluded:
In other words, contract law seems here an ill fit for a promise
of news source confidentiality. To impose a contract theory on
this arrangement puts an unwarranted legal rigidity on a special
ethical relationship, precluding necessary consideration of factors
underlying that ethical relationship. We conclude that a contract cause of action is inappropriate for these particular
45
circumstances.
Of course, one can disagree about whether, on the facts of the
case, the parties had or had not actually manifested an intention to
be legally bound. But, the dissenters focused their fire not on the
evidence of intent to be bound, but instead on the majority's implicit rejection of the promise theory, which maintains that the issue
of intent to create contractual relations is irrelevant to contract formation. Justice Yetka argued:
The simple truth of the matter is that the appellants made a promise of confidentiality to Cohen in consideration for information
they considered newsworthy. That promise was broken and, as a
direct consequence, Cohen lost his job. Under established rules
of contract law, the appellants should be responsible for the con46
sequences of that broken promise.
Justice Kelly, in dissent, explicitly advocated the promise theory:
I remain unpersuaded by the majority's analysis that, notwithstanding that all the elements of a legal contract and its breach are
here present, the contract is unenforceable because "the parties
intended none." It reaches this conclusion even as it concedes
that the promises given by the agents and employees of these de47
fendants was [sic] intended by them to be kept.

In sum; both dissenting opinions accepted the conventional approach that a promise is actionable whether or not it is accompanied
by a manifested intention to be legally bound. Their passionate dissents on this issue support my interpretation that the majority had
in its opinion implicitly rejected the promise theory and, perhaps
unwittingly, embraced a consent theory.
44

Id. Notice how this language rejects the moral theory of "contract as promise"

offered by Charles Fried.
45
46

Id.

Id at 205. Notice that Justice Yetka's language implicitly relies on the injurious
reliance rationale for enforcing promises.
47 Id. at 206. Of course, had the promisors not intended to keep the promise at the
time they made it, the legal theory would have been fraud, not breach of contract. See
Barnett & Becker, supra note 9, at 485-95.
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Ultimately, however, the majority made the telling theoretical
mistake of considering the plaintiff's promissory estoppel argument
as wholly unrelated to the issue of intent to contract.4 8 By holding
that the First Amendment, rather than the lack of contractual consent, barred a promissory estoppel cause of action, the stage was set
for the Supreme Court reversal that eventually occurred.
CONCLUSION

Those who are interested in maintaining the life of contract
should take an interest in the theories of contract that are discussed
in the law schools. It is not enough to lambast the courts for reaching results that one intuitively finds absurd. One must also burrow
beneath the results to find the flaw in the theory or doctrine that
produced the outcome. For, until we discover the theoretical or
doctrinal error, we can never be completely sure that it is the result
rather than our intuitions that are mistaken.
The promise theory has been accepted for decades because it
comports with some of our most basic intuitions about contractual
obligations. Unfortunately, where it deviates from these intuitions,
the promise theory has led to results and doctrines that have undermined the centrality of consent in contract law and theory. A consent theory of contract preserves much of what is intuitively
appealing about the promise theory while incorporating many of the
results and doctrines upon which opponents of consent have based
their theories. In this way, a consent theory of contract transcends
the limitations of the promise theory, and thereby helps to preserve
the twin liberal values of freedom from and freedom to contract.

48
For an analysis of promissory estoppel from the perspective of contractual consent, see Barnett, supra note 6; Barnett & Becker, supra note 9.

"CONTRACTS IS NOT DEAD"
E. Allan Farnswortht
Thank you Judge Bork. I am going to save Professor Barnett
until rebuttal. I am now going to attack Justice Grodin a little and
Mr. Olson a lot, as he has written a book, exposing him on every
flank.
I largely agree with Walter Olson on two principles. One is that
you should make your own bed and lie in it. And the other is that
you should not whine if the other party reallocates. The first says
that if you shift risk or limit liability in your contract, you should be
stuck with that. The second says that if one party commits what
some law and economics folks call an efficient breach, the other
party should not whine or ask for punitives, although the aggrieved
party is entitled to compensation. By and large I tend to agree with
those principles, but I want to make two exceptions.
One exception is for consumer cases. In Mr. Olson's chapter
on contracts in his book, The Litigation Explosion, he spends most of
his time on unconscionability cases involving consumers. To show
my mean streak, I want to point out that all of those cases were at
least ten years old when the book was published. I have a more
upbeat message which I will give shortly. But consumer cases are
something we might argue about.
Personal injury cases also pose problems. As to them, I have a
sense of d~ji v6, as this is the room in which the Reporter for Restatement projects in the American Law Institute defends drafts
before much less friendly audiences. They tell you what you have
done wrong and take votes requiring you to redo your work. One of
the things that I had the pleasure of presenting here was a provision
in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(3): a term exempting the
seller of a product from special tort liability for physical harm to a
user or a consumer is enforceable if the the term is "fairly bargained
for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability." 1 If
t
Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.S., University of
Michigan; M.A., Yale University; J.D., Columbia University. His published works include many examinations of contracts, including his recent three volume. Farnsworthon
Contracts (1990). He was Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts from 1971 to
1980. Professor Farnsworth has been active in international law and has taught at the
University of Paris, Harvard, Stetson, the University of Chicago, the University of Istanbul, and the University of Michigan.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(3) (1981).
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you think that is too cautious a statement of freedom of contract,
take a look at comment m to section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which says that you simply cannot disclaim the liability
stated in that section. It took some diplomatic skill to get the American Law Institute to do a flip-flop and say in the black letter something that was the opposite of what they said in the torts comment.
I have limited disagreement with Mr. Olson, but my message is
different. His was that contracts is going to the dogs, maybe even
dying. Justice Grodin may have reinforced that from another perspective. Judge Bork said that this is what he liked to hear in the
morning, a dismal message. Professor Barnett was more upbeat and
I intend to be upbeat as well. I do not know whether this will make
Judge Bork's day or ruin his morning. I am going to talk about four
developments in the last year or so that seem to be encouraging. I
am going to be anecdotal, as Mr. Olson was anecdotal. I am sorry to
tell you the anecdotes that I will tell are less funny than his-the
ones where the bad guy wins after getting hit by the foul ball or the
bad gal wins after botching the recipe by putting the can in without
opening it. If those people had lost, however, nobody would have
talked about the case and certainly if they had, nobody would have
laughed.
Now, point one: you make your bed and lie in it. I think unconscionability in the commercial area is overrated as a subject of discussion. There are franchise cases in which a gas station operator
with a high school education does battle with an oil company over
an allegedly unfair contract. They are not so different from consumer cases. Then there are people who are now stylishly described
as persons in agribusiness but who would have been called farmers a
few years ago, and who have trouble reading the things on bags of
seed and pesticides. And then there are the unfortunate businesses
that get their ads botched or omitted in the yellow pages so that
nobody calls them. Those are some of the players in commercial
cases. There is a bigger game, however. The cases involving limitations of remedies are much more important. That is a field where
things have been in equipoise for nearly ten years and it is interesting to see which way courts might be heading.
Manufacturers and other distributors frequently put in a provision saying that all they will do for you if something goes wrong is
repair or replace, and that they are also not liable for any consequential damages. Those are two separate provisions. What the
courts did first was to use a i-ather arcane provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code that says if a limited remedy fails of its essential
purpose, the court can ignore it and apply any remedy that would
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otherwise be available. 2 Courts reasoned that if you say you will repair or replace something, but you do not fix it and it still will not
work, then the limited repair or replace remedy fails in its essential
purpose. You can reasonably argue with that, but that is the way
most courts have gone. What is most surprising is that since about
1977 a series of cases called the "house of cards" cases say that if
your repair and replacement provision falls, then everything else
3
falls like a house of cards, including the no consequentials clause.
You are then exposed to full liability. The first case on that was an
8th Circuit case in 1977 called Soo Line. 4 Walter, do not flinch, the
word is S-o-o, not S-u-e. Many similar cases have been in the federal courts on diversity jurisdiction and who knows what on earth
the state courts would do if they were to decide the cases. In the last
year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has come out
with a significant decision rejecting the house of cards view and saying that if you put in two distinct provisions and one is stricken
under the code, then the other one remains. 5 You can try to attack
the negation of consequentials on grounds of unconscionability.
But, unless you run a gas station, are buying seed, or are listing
yourself in the yellow pages, you probably will not have a great deal
of success.
There is another case from a court at least as well-known as the
county court that decided the Walter Olsen's Cubs case. 6 It is Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,7 a consumer case decided by the Supreme
Court earlier this year with two justices dissenting. The Shutes, who
were from the state of Washington, decided that they would take a
cruise to Mexico that originated in Los Angeles. They went to a
Washington travel agent, bought a ticket, flew to Los Angeles, got
on a ship, and went off to the Mexican coast. Mrs. Shute slipped on
a deck mat during a tour of the galleys and, figuring that there was
tort liability, sued in Washington. Carnival Cruise Line said, "Look
on the back in the fairly fine print. It says you have to sue us in
Florida; we are a Florida corporation." 8 The Ninth Circuit had held
that this provision was not enforceable. 9 But the Supreme Court
said it was enforceable. 10 This case has an interesting discussion
which you ought to look at in comparison with Justice Grodin's dis2

U.C.C. § 2-719 (1990).

S

See, e.g., McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980).

4
5
6
7
8
9

Soo Line R.R. v. Freuhauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977).
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182 (Mass. 1990).
See Stacy Adler, Chicago Jury Takes Swing at Cubs, Bus. INS., Dec. 4, 1989, at 3.
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
Id. at 1524.
Id. at 1524-25.
Id. at 1526-29.

10

1992]

CONTRACTS IS NOT DEAD

1037

cussion of adhesion contracts. Note that the Shutes lost a fairly appealing case. They were in Washington. They never had any
contact with Florida. The Florida company's ship was operating on
the West Coast. They did not go to Florida to take the cruise, but
went to Los Angeles to take it to Mexico. Nevertheless, the Court
said that the defendant wanted to be sued in Florida, that that is
more efficient for the defendant, and that one pays less for a ticket
because of that efficiency." There is nothing wrong with an adhesion contract, per se. The mere fact that it is a standard form in what
is today's common method of doing business is not an impediment
to enforceability.
The second point is no punitive damages. Although Mr. Olson
in his book discussed punitive damages, he did not do so this morning. But other speakers, including Vice President Quayle, have said
things at recent meetings about punitive damages. In the early
1980s, when Justice Grodin was a member of the California
Supreme Court, the court handed down a unanimous decision, with
a separate opinion by ChiefJustice Bird, urging the court to go even
2
beyond what they did. It was the Seaman's Direct Buying Service case,'
and it extended the bad faith breach liability of insurers, a liability
that had spread from California to many other states, where it had
also been limited to insurers. By dictum, Seaman's extended this liability to ordinary commercial contracts not involving insurers, at
least as long as the parties had a special relationship.' 3 Then many
intermediate courts in California went on to discuss what would
constitute a special relationship. It was commonly assumed that an
employment relationship would be a likely candidate for a special
relationship under Seaman's.' 4 But in 1988, the California Supreme
Court decided Foley v. Interactive Data.'5 Of the Seaman's court, only
two members remained. Five new members did some violence to
the Seaman's case, and a recent intermediate appellate court case
characterized Foley as a drastic change in the Supreme Court's decision.' 6 The winds of change blew in 1988. Before Foley, one could
confidently suggest that at least two spheres of contract relationships, insurance and long-term employment agreements, could give
rise to bad faith breach and tort damages. But after Foley, only insurance was left, which suggests that California was back to where
they were before the Seaman's case. The Seaman's case has not been
widely followed elsewhere. Montana is a state where bad faith
I
12

13
14

15
16

Id at 1527.
Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
Id. at 1166.
Id. at n.6.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. 1991).
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breach is still alive and well, though no longer a tort.1 7 But certainly
the experience in California is an upbeat one for those who think
that punitive damages have no place in contracts.
I will mention only briefly another development: punitive damages in arbitration. This raises two questions. One is, "Do arbitrators have power to award punitive damages?" The state that has the
most negative view on this question is New York, going back to a
case called Garrity v. Lyle Stewart.1 8 Garrity says that under New York
law arbitrators do not have the power to award punitive damages.
The other question is, "Would it make a difference if you were in an
arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act?" The Federal
Arbitration Act 1 9 governs international arbitrations and many domestic arbitrations, and I think most people thought that Garrity was
dead in cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act because federal arbitration policy would prevail.
In the last year two cases, Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. 20 and Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 21 were decided in the Southern District of New York, expressing opinions in opposite directions. Barbier said yes: the federal act governs even though New
York substantive law is applicable; the arbitrators can award punitive damages. Fahnestock said no: if New York law governs, the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt and arbitrators cannot award
punitive damages. The Second Circuit has recently passed on the
Fahnestock case 22 and has upheld the view that Garrity applies even
though the arbitration is generally governed by the federal act as
23
long as a New York law is applicable.
So my message is: I do not disagree with Mr. Olson on some of
the fundamental points, especially as applied to commercial cases,
but be of good cheer, contracts is not dead. It is not even going to
the dogs, but is alive and well. Some of you will remember that both
yesterday and this morning in Judge Bork's introduction, reference
was made to the changing role of a changing judiciary. Certainly
those of you who look at the Carnival Cruise Lines case 2 4 in the
17

Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990).

18
19

Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1988).
752 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (2d

20

Cir. 1991).
21

1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11024 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3342 (1991), distinguished in Todd Shipyards v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063
n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) on the ground that in Todd "the expansive AAA arbitration provision
was a part of the contract."
23 Id. at 518.
24
Ill S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
22
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Supreme Court and look at the Foley case 2 5 in the California
Supreme Court will have the view that if the courts as they were
constituted ten years ago had faced those cases, they would not be
examples that I would have given you this morning for the increasing or at least resurgent role of contract as opposed to tort.

25

765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).

CONTRACT, TORT, AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
Joseph R. Grodint
Professor Olson provided us with an amusing and fast moving
dialogue. I would like to present an analytic framework focusing
upon contract and its relation to tort within the theme of this conference on individual responsibility. To begin, I invite you to accept
a series of propositions.
First, governments and private power centers oppress people.
That is, employers, labor unions, and insurance companies may oppress. Second, such oppression is a legitimate subject of government concern and action. When private power centers oppress
people, it is appropriate for government to intervene through law
and address that oppression. Third, contract, while historically the
handmaiden of liberty, can also be a tool of oppression. Sir Henry
Maine talked about how the progress of the law evolved from status
to contract but we know that contract can also be a form of status.'
I used to represent labor unions. Labor unions have bylaws
and, as their lawyer, I argued that a union's bylaws should be viewed
as a contract among the members of the union or between the union
and each member individually. Thus, when a person became a
member of a union, he subscribed to a contract and was bound by it.
If the contract authorized expulsion from union membership for any
reason or by any process, the member agreed to such a provision
and should have been held to it.
The courts, quite properly, rejected that proposition 2 and ruled
that union bylaws are contracts in name only. They are contracts of
adhesion. Such contracts exist when a party with superior bargaining strength imposes a contract upon an individual under circumt
B.A., U.C. Berkeley; J.D., Yale University; Ph.D. Labor Law/Labor Relations,
London School of Economics. From 1955 to 1972, Justice Grodin worked with a San

Francisco firm specializing in labor law. The author taught at the U.C. Hastings College
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Court of Appeals, in 1982 a PresidingJustice of the Court of Appeals, and from 1982 to
1987 was an Associate Justice on the California Supreme Court. He returned to
academia in 1987, first teaching at U.C. Berkeley and U.C.L.A., then returning to U.C.
Hastings where he is still on the faculty.
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stances where no market really exists-they are a form of status
imposed in the guise of contract. Both courts and legislatures imposed limitations upon the union-member relationship that were
not limited by the terms of any agreement.
In the employment relationship, similar limitations on contract
exist. We cannot contract to sell ourselves into slavery. We cannot
give up freedom in return for any amount of money such that a
court will enforce the bargain. Legislatively imposed wage and hour
laws exist. We also have worker's compensation, which overrides
the terms of any contrary agreement. Professor Olson talked about
the man at the baseball game.3 Do we want to live in a society in
which a worker, as a condition of obtaining employment, may be
required to relinquish any claim to employer liability through
worker's compensation or negligence? Title VII, with its limitations
upon contract, promotes nondiscrimination principles. 4 The Occupational Safety and Health Act tells us that, as a matter of public
policy, questions of safety will not be left entirely to the marketplace. 5 The recent polygraph testing law tells us that a contract cannot determine when an employer may insist upon giving employees
a polygraph test or when that employer may rely upon such tests as
a basis for dismissal. These are all intrusions upon contract. The
aforementioned intrusions are the result of legislative action rather
than judicial creations. If what we are talking about is contract versus individual responsibility, however, the source of the incursion is
irrelevant.
It is important to recognize that we are not talking about the
Madisonian dilemma here. We are not talking about constitutional
principles and the autonomy of an unelected judiciary imposing its
will upon the democratically elected branches. We are talking about
common law. We are talking about a set of legal principles that
judges created. Judges may have created those legal principles with
attention to standards that permeated the institutions of particular
societies. They were created, nevertheless, by human beings and
they were not a brooding omnipresence in the sky.
The common law, by definition, is subject to change. A continuing dialogue exists between the courts and the legislature. For example, in the field of labor union regulations, the exceptions to
contract principles that courts developed in the adjudicative process
came to be adopted by federal and state legislatures. Similarly, in
California, the legislature adopted and codified the principles devel3
See Walter Olson, Tortification of Contract Law: DisplacingConsent andAgreement, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1043 (1992).
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oped by courts. When the legislature did not agree with those principles, it changed them. Thus, there is nothing peculiar about
judge-made law with respect to the tension between contract and
tort.
The question, then, is not whether we will have some abstract
and sacrosanct notion of freedom of contract. The question is,
under what circumstances is the law justified in limiting the use of
contract by one party to impose conditions upon another that society may regard as oppressive. I suppose the answer is that the justification exists under those circumstances in which we think the
market does not operate very well, either because we have some theoretical basis for believing that in particular contexts the market
does not operate as the economists tell us it ought to operate-as, I
suggest, in the employment context or in the insurance context-or
because, as a pragmatic matter, we look at the results and we find
them to be unacceptable. Look at the issue of safety in the work
place. We are not prepared to tell a worker who is subjected to unsafe conditions, "If you do not like it, go get a job elsewhere."
Finally, I have a comment on the question of remedies. I think
it is important to distinguish between the question, "Under what
circumstances should the law impose unwaivable contractual conditions?" and the question, "What kinds of remedies should be invoked for what kinds of obligations?" Again, these questions can be
posed to legislatures and to courts. A legislature can readily include
additional compensatory remedies and perhaps punitive damages
for victims of discrimination. Unfortunately, the common law principles relating to remedies have rigidly developed. Thus, courts
have available to them either contract principles or tort principles of
recovery, both of which are rather rigid. Contract principles often
yield inadequate recoveries for certain kinds of injuries (for example, when an insurance company not only fails to pay benefits provided for in the policy but engages in deceptive practices in the
hope that policyholders will abandon their claims). Hiring a lawyer
in such a case may not be worthwhile if all that can be recovered
ultimately is the amount that was originally owed. In such circumstances, the tort remedy is an alternative that courts have available
to them. There are problems with tort remedies, however, especially with respect to unlimited punitive damages. Perhaps the ideal
solution does not lie either in the realms of contract or tort doctrine
but in more creative remedies that the legislature might develop.
That is hardly an argument, however, for holding their hands behind their collective backs and doing nothing.

TORTIFICATION OF CONTRACT LAW:
DISPLACING CONSENT AND AGREEMENT
Walter Olsen t
One of the consequences of recent world events is the impending demise ofjokes about communism. For the record, I would like
to preserve the one about the veteran party leader who is haranguing the troops-this is before they have taken over-and tells them:
"After the revolution, comrades, everyone will dine on strawberries
and cream." A hand goes up at the back of the room. It is a new
recruit. "But comrade," he says, "I don't like strawberries and
cream."
The leader explains that strawberries and cream is a wholesome
and natural dish, universally recognized as a tasty treat, even written
up in poetry. He argues very systematically, but the man at the back
is unconvinced. "Well, I don't know why," he says, "but Ijust don't
care for them." At which point the leader loses patience: "Rest assured, comrade, that after the revolution you will like strawberries
and cream."
That is what is called paternalism. It is not confined to any one
movement or part of the political spectrum. It tends to crop up
wherever utopian ideas are found, and is even found in something
as far from communism as the American court system.
The paternalist project for our civil courts runs something as
follows. After the revolution-which perhaps has already taken
place-the average citizen will enjoy a vast array of wonderful new
rights to sue other people. You will be empowered to haul your
neighbors and fellow citizens to court if you feel they have fallen
short of good faith and fair play. You will be entitled to sue them
for unlimited damages, punitive as well as compensatory, even over
behavior that had previously been thought not subject to liability at
all. Everyone will be under a vague but stringent obligation to look
out for your safety and welfare, enforceable by legal action. You will
enjoy a cornucopia of contention opportunities, a smorgasbord of
suing options, a Lotus-land of litigability.
At this point you may raise your hand, like the recruit, to say
that you are not sure you want all these new benefits. You may not
t
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want to keep others terrified about how and when they can be sued
for dealing with you. You may disagree with the courts' current definition of what is negligent or defective or unreasonable in others'
behavior. You may, in short, be inclined to stamp your new legal
entitlements "return to sender." But you are out of luck. You will
find that many of your rights to sue, like the strawberries and cream,
cannot be waived. The rights are grounded not in traditional contract law but in the principles of tort law. They are undisclaimable.
We know the basic differences. Tort law is modeled on the onesided, gratuitous infliction, as when a stranger drives into your front
porch and demolishes it. Nothing is pre-arranged or arrangeable;
nothing is of mutual benefit. In a contract situation, your front
porch is still ruined, but it is because an incompetent renovator has
gotten his hands on it. Tort law is seen as externally imposed; it
may reflect what some call natural law, or society's arbitrary decision
of who should be responsible for what, but in any case it reflects
something other than the choice of the parties. Contract obligations
are seen as a product of agreement. Tort law may in some sense
reduce itself to: "because we say so"-we being society as a whole
or judges or juries. Contract law is supposed to be: "because you
said so."
Other distinctions are familiar as well. In tort cases one can
typically ask for punitive damages and damages for such hard-tomeasure things as pain and suffering, humiliation, and emotional
distress. In contract law, the assumption is that absent some signal
to the contrary, the parties will not make such demands on each
other. The idea is that both sides have tacitly agreed to disarm
themselves of the most intimidating legal weaponry as a condition
of doing business, even as gunslingers are supposed to check their
weapons on entering the saloon.'
That was then. More recently, in what has been called the tortification of contract law, courts have begun to treat more and more
consensual interactions as if they were, in part or whole, gratuitous
inflictions of harm. The machinery and weaponry of tort law, including notions of punishment and open-ended damage calculations, are displacing the notion of consent and agreement.
Consider what happened after first baseman Leon Durham hit a
foul ball into the stands at a Chicago Cubs baseball game. The ball
struck Delbert Yates, Jr., who sued. The admission ticket to the ball
1 The ban on penalty clauses in contracts, which forces contracting parties to resort to bonding and other stratagems when they want to arrange matters so as to penalize one party for noncompliance, can be seen as an even clearer statement of the law's
assumption that, absent strong evidence to the contrary, people will deal with each other
only on an understanding not to sue for each other's punishment.
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park specifically disclaimed liability for any such event. Additionally, the tradition in baseball is against plaintiff recovery for foul
balls, with or without disclaimer. 2 Still, a Cook County circuit court
allowed recovery. 3 The ticket made no difference, and apparently
would have made none even if Yates had signed it and had it
notarized.
In the mortgage world, lenders in Oklahoma and other states
are currently faced with a remarkable new judicial innovation inelegantly called the "cramdown." The situation arises when a borrower is bankrupt but is trying to stave off foreclosure. The value of
the house has fallen sharply since it was financed. The borrower
asks that part of the mortgage simply be amputated to reflect the
decline in the value of the house, whereupon the borrower will resume payments on the smaller amount. The court agrees, sometimes, and orders this. 4 As a borrower's attorney put it, "If the
lender makes a stupid loan, why shouldn't he pay for it?" To which
the old reply would have been: "Because your client promised he
would not."
Similar trends are seen in employment law, in landlord-tenant
law, in insurance law, and so forth. More obligations have been
made undisclaimable, more exculpatory clauses have been struck
down as unconscionable, more duties have been grounded in public
policy rather than the evident agreement of the parties.
One of my least favorite cases along these lines comes from the
investment world. Discount stock brokers, who do not maintain research staffs or commissioned salespeople, have been thriving in recent years. To many of us, their most attractive feature is not their
low rates (though that is nice too) but that they never call. If you
have an account with Charles Schwab, you may sit down to dinner
without expecting the phone to ring with an urgent admonition to
sell everything they advised you to buy last week and buy everything
they told you to sell, for your own good of course. If you want,
Schwab will give you direct access to the market over your modem
or touch-tone phone, with no human intermediary at all, like a vending machine for stock purchases. 5
2
See Davidoff v. Metropolitan Baseball Club, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1219 (N.Y. 1984);
Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981); Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club, 296 P.2d 495 (Ore. 1956); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, 229 P.2d 329
(Wash. 1951). See also Walter T. Champion, Jr., "At the Ol'Ball Game" and Beyond: Spectators and the Potentialfor Liability, 14 AM.J. TRIAL. ADvoc. 495 (1991).
3 See Stacy Adler, ChicagoJury Takes Swing at Cubs, Bus. INs., Dec. 4, 1989, at 3.
4
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); Todd Mason, Lenders Cringe As
Judges Chop Mortgage Value, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1990, at B1.
5 Jason Zweig, A Touch of Class, FORBES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 82-84 (20 percent of
Schwab's trades come in by way of touch-tone systems, 6 percent by modem).
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Unfortunately, some creative lawyers have launched an effort to
redefine this blessed neglect as negligence. One of them, representing a client who had made very bad investments, successfully filed a
claim against Schwab for, as he colorfully put it, letting his client
commit financial suicide. It was ruled that Schwab had an affirmative duty to look after his client's interests and should pay for

6
breaching that duty.

If the ruling stands, it is not hard to predict what will happen.
Discount brokers will have to monitor their clients' holdings much
more carefully and take affirmative steps to get in touch with clients
when they see dangerous patterns. Commission rates will go up,
and customers will be back to square one, wondering how to separate the sincere advice from the self-interested churning. In effect,
consumers will have lost access to a valuable do-it-yourself option.
My point is that it is frequently quite rational to deal with people who are not being especially careful on our behalf, who we expect to be only human, negligent or worse, who might turn out to
injure us or stand by while we injure ourselves. We choose to get
into the car with a family member at the wheel whom we consider an
incompetent driver. We go on doing business with the friendly dry
cleaner who breaks our shirt buttons. We let our neighbors take the
short cut across our property although they tread carelessly. We
return and buy more items from the sharpster antique dealer because, though you cannot trust his sales pitch, his prices are great.
As we forgive others their trespasses, others forgive us. Imagine the chaos in a modern economy if employers insisted on seeking
damages against their workers every time they suffered losses from
negligence on the job. If you err on the computer and your company's mainframe shuts down for an afternoon, the company is very
unlikely to come after you with a claim for business interruption and
lost sales, as it might if you were a stranger whose negligence had
done the same damage. The shallowness of your pockets is only
one reason. Employers rationally recognize that they have a reputation for good will to protect among their employees and that by forswearing their right to recover damages, they are much more likely
to attract and keep workers and get their full cooperation on the job.
So they are understood to promise to overlook most negligent behavior-or at least to penalize such behavior with no sanction harsher than dismissal.
So it is with all of us: every day of our lives we pre-forgive
someone else's injurious, destructive, or even malicious behavior,
6

See Michael Siconolfi, Accountability Is the New Duty of Discounters, Big Board Says,
1991, at C1.
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the better to reassure them that they will not be too sorry for having
dealt with us. We give free passes to klutzes and hype artists, renegers and downright SOBs, agreeing not to push our legal rights
against them to a maximum, because we would rather not forego
dealing with them at all. And having made our bed, we are willing
to lie in it, although others get more than their precise share of the
blanket. None of this seems strange except to the modern legal
7
mind.
We are frequently warned of the danger of assuming that people can knowingly take care of themselves and assume risks. That
view, we are told, is "atomistic," or suited only to a simpler society,
or assumes omniscience on the part of an unwary consumer. In reality, it is urged, most people do not really feel at liberty in their
dealings in the market place. They will say that there was no real
alternative to applying for a mortgage on such and such terms, or
that they were forced to stay at a particularjob because no other was
anywhere near as suitable, or that they signed a separation agreement under duress because the alternatives at the time of the marital split were just too unpleasant.
Of course there is an element of truth in these characterizations
sufficient to provide fuel for discussion. Markets are not perfectly
competitive, finding alternatives can be prohibitively bothersome,
and emergency situations force people into quick decisions.
But if there is a dot of yin in the yang, a bit of helpless victimization even in the most seemingly voluntary dealings by the sturdiest
citizens, so there is also a dot of yang in the yin. Even in the stranger cases, where tort law has always had its greatest intuitive
strength, there is commonly a trace at least of consent, agreement,
and voluntariness. It is recognized in such traditional doctrines as
comparative negligence and especially assumption of risk. In assumption of risk cases there may not be an explicit verbal contract,
but there is often a kind of nonverbal signaling. Compare, for example, the Chicago Cubs case with the familiar case where a local
stranger stops by to watch an amateur softball game, because it is
fun to watch softball games, and is beaned by a foul ball. There is
no explicit contract there, no ticket stub like that given out by the
Cubs to those who pass through their gate. And yet it is not too
7 For one of many examples of the anti-disclaimer view, see WILLIAM M. LANDES&
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 282 (1987) ("[I]f we ob-

serve a clause disclaiming negligence, the presumption is that the consumer has been
deceived .. " (explaining why product liability disclaimers are not enforced in today's
courts)). Landes and Posner hypothesize that any conduct diagnosed by a court as negligence ipsofacto flunks a cost-benefit test. They then argue that rational buyers would
not voluntarily excuse less-than-cost-beneficial behavior in a seller when the happy alternative is to require it as part of the contract and divide the resulting gains.
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hard to see that the spectator moved to the risk and can be said to
have voluntarily, if not verbally, evinced a willingness to live with
that risk.
Part of our task, then, I would argue, is not only to roll back the
intrusion of tort law principles into contractual arrangements, but
also to re-import into tort law the contract-like principles that we
have kicked out of it. Without some element of consent and mutuality, after all, resorting to law is a simple struggle of all against all, a
pure instrument of force and recrimination (albeit perhaps justified)
in which people raid each others' stores and demand each others'
chastisement.
We read in one book after another that assumption of risk is a
dying doctrine, a remnant of the bad old legal regime. Do not believe it. Assumption of risk lives on in the common sense of millions
of Americans who go into the back country for a hike, or enter the
hospital for an operation, or take out a mortgage, with confident
willingness to face a full measure of resulting risk. In speaking to
audiences about the litigation explosion, no question comes up as
often as this one: people ask, "Whatever happened to personal responsibility?" Why don't people recognize that sometimes they
make a bad bargain, or made a bad gamble, and just live with the
result? Why do they try to get money by blaming someone else?
The cases that annoy people most are the ones where people
are most blatantly trying to evade responsibility. The drunk who fell
on the subway tracks in New York and was awarded $9.3 million.8
The would-be suicide who jumped deliberately and was awarded
$600,000 million, her case being less sympathetic. 9 The lawsuits
brought by-as opposed to against-drunk drivers.' 0 The case
where a woman read a recipe in Woman's Day which began, "put a
can of soup in the crock pot," and did not realize that she should
open and empty the can of soup.'1 Apparently she got money; the
publishers settled the case.
For some time assumption of risk has been unfashionable
among legal theorists. But it has never lost its life among the general public. It is the proper legal reflection of the sense of individual
responsibility that has made, still makes, and should continue to
make America a great and free country.

8 See Calvin Sims, $9 Million Won For Loss of Arm In Drunken Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 1990, at B3. See also Ellison v. New York City Transit Authority, 470 N.Y.S.2d 144
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
9 Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159 (NJ. 1988).
10 Arizona Isn't Immune, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1990.
11 Larry Bodine, New Dangers in the LegalJungle, MAGAZINE WEEK, Sept. 17, 1990, at

DISCUSSION
OLSON:
Let me start by saying that I found Randy Barnett's comments
very persuasive. In general, the divergence between one's moral estimate of promises and what the law has historically enforced has
turned out to hinge on what are effectively evidentiary considerations. The doctrine of consideration, the complexities of offer and
acceptance, the requirement of a writing, are all methods by which a
court can reduce the risk of being mistaken about when there was an
actual promise. They raise the requirement of proof, particularly in
cases where there is a high likelihood of honest error or of fraudulent claims that a promise was made. The general rule has been that
if you can enable a high enough mound of evidence, you can get just
about any promise enforced, except for a promise to enslave oneself, where there are historical reasons for an exception.
The difference with unconscionability is that it really puts what
I call a penny in the fuse box. It means that no matter how hard you
try, no matter how clear the evidence of the other side's consent,
you just cannot do it.
In many ways I agree with Professor Farnsworth that the courts
are actually not as badly off as my anecdotes might suggest. Perhaps
contract is alive and well, or at least recuperating on a Carnival
Cruise ship. And many sports-related assumption of risk cases have
gone in the right direction.
Still, I am not entirely comforted to know that individual liberty
has been extinguished only in cases involving consumers and small
producers. Those are important categories. It seems to me that we
may want oil companies to continue giving franchises to people with
a high school education rather than demanding post-graduate
study. But if those with low education are given special rights to
litigate the unconscionability of their franchise agreements, companies are going to draw the opposite conclusion.
Even if deals between large businesses or wealthy persons are
seldom voided on grounds of unconscionability or public policy, the
arguments can still give them a powerful weapon to use against each
other in litigation. If such a claim does not win at trial, it can still be
a way to avoid summary judgment, get more access to discovery,
and thus raise the imposition value of the case. We may observe
that Ivana Trump got past summary judgment when her lawyers attacked her $20-million-plus-mansion-in-Connecticut postnuptial
1049
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agreement as unconscionable. This attack gave her lawyers an important bargaining chip.
We eventually get back to Justice Grodin's critique of the oppressiveness of dealings between private parties. There is not really
time to do this topic justice, so I will just pause to note one paradox:
we have declared it to be socially intolerable for anyone else to inflict on a consenting adult the same sort of risks that he is perfectly
willing to inflict on himself. Consider smoking, the most lethal of
voluntary pastimes. Most of us agree that adults should have the
right to smoke three packs a day if they wish. But it is also thought
unconscionable to allow them to assume the vastly smaller risks of
sidestream smoke in the workplace. People may drive fast, live on
the wild side, risk life and limb in a hundred ways, so long as it is
just for kicks and without a thought; but if someone pays them to do
it and they sign a consent form, they are being oppressed.
One of the curious facts in the world of occupational safety and
health is that the most dangerous conditions and highest injury
rates occur disproportionately often in family businesses: farms,
fishing boats, backyard mines and lumbering operations, and small
construction outfits where the work force consists mostly or entirely
of the owner and family members. People are choosing an alarming
level of risk, or choosing it for their dearest family members, but
there is no visible oppressor on the scene.
On insurance bad faith, finally, I would point out that the basic
problem here is that we do not routinely award legal fees to the
prevailing party. Most countries do, which encourages insurers to
pay up promptly when they are liable on a claim. The equally welcome corollary is that fee-shifting discourages claimaints from
pressing dubious or exaggerated claims against insurers. It is about
time we joined the rest of the world on this point.
GRODIN:

I want to focus on this Carnival Cruise case because I think it is
interesting. The analysis that Professor Farnsworth offers is that the
choice of law provision is efficient in that it reduces the cruise line's
cost and therefore reduces the amount that people have to pay in
order to take a cruise. Of course, there is no denying that proposition. The same analysis is universally available. If I am admitted to
a hospital and the hospital, as a condition of admission, asks me to
sign a form waiving any liability on the part of the hospital for negligence, no matter how gross, there is no question that this provision
serves the economic interests of the hospital and indirectly the interests of patients: it lowers the costs of medical care. That kind of
argument can be used to support not only a cruise line's choice of
law provisions, but any provision in any contract. The question is,
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"What do we mean by choice?" The Shutes, we can say, did not

have to take a cruise. But what do we say to a person who is about
to enter the hospital? That he ought to ask for forms from other
hospitals to see whether he can find a hospital that will perform the
operation without such a waiver or reconsider whether, after all, he
needs an operation? For people who are concerned with contract as
an instrument of choice, I think we have to ask ourselves what we
mean by that in the real world.
And finally, one observation about the Foley case. With all respect, I do not read the Seaman's case the way Professor Farnsworth
does. I participated in the decision. I do not think that it stands
broadly for the proposition that a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the commercial context gives rise to tort
remedies. Quite the contrary. The opinion contains a lot of language-most of which I suspect Professor Farnsworth would argue
with- discussing why that might be inappropriate and rejecting the
notion that a jury should be left to determine when a breach is an
"efficient" breach.' The opinion suggests that breach of the covenant would be appropriate as a tort only in rather narrow circumstances, of which in California the insurance context is one. There
is a footnote in Seaman's suggesting that the employment context
might also be appropriate for such treatment, 2 but Foley declines to
3
accept that suggestion.
I can understand the policy arguments for why an employer
who has breached his contract with an employee, even under circumstances in which it could be said that he has done so in a manner
inconsistent with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, should
not be subject to the range of remedies commonly associated with
tort doctrine. On the other hand, I think it has to be recognized that
the effect of the Foley case is that in California the only people who
can now bring suit against their employers for breach of contract are
people who are in the high wage brackets and whose claim is sufficient to warrant litigation. People who earn less, your Joe Boilermaker, can no more sue his employer for breach of contract as a
practical matter than, in the old days, a member of the union could
sue the union for oppressive conduct.
I find myself agreeing with Mr. Olson that the way out of this
dilemma ideally does not lie in the direction of choosing tort remedies over contract remedies, but rather by refraining the kinds of
remedies that we have for breach of contract, perhaps expanding
1 Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-70 (Cal.
1984) (passim).
2 Id. at 1166 n.6.
3 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-401 (Cal. 1988).
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them, and almost certainly including attorney's fees. I think that is
at the very heart of the problem. And it is one of the dilemmas the
courts confront in this arena.
FARNSWORTH:
I have three very quick points. The first is with respect to Mr.
Olson's remarks on franchisees. One of the things that has been left
out is that legislation is far more important than this discussion
would suggest. The law of franchisees in most states is dominated
by legislation and that is true of the whole consumer area. So as for
these stories about what courts are doing, the total impact is a lot
less important than what legislatures have done, at least in the consumer area.
On the Shute case, I may have done some disservice to Justice
Blackmun, who wrote the opinion, by giving such a short summary.
What I said was essentially his argument, not mine, and I think he
would have no difficulty in distinguishing the cruise line from the
hospital. Many states have distinguished hospitals from other activities-notably, sky diving and stock car racing come to mind-and I
wonder howJustice Grodin would deal with an exculpatory clause in
one of those two kinds of activities. Most courts have said that
though you do not choose the form on which you contract, you
choose to engage in those activities.
As to the Foley case, my discussion of that case and Seaman's consisted largely of a quotation from an intermediate court that interpreted it. 4 Review was denied on that intermediate court case by the
California Supreme Court, one judge dissenting. 5 The dissenting
judge, who apparently found fault with the lower court's description
of what happened, was the surviving member of the original Sea6
man's court, Justice Mosk.
QUESTION:

Won't many of the legislative proposals for tort reform take the
form of having the federal government act in a number of ways? My
question is prompted because we have both constitutional and contract scholars on the panel. What are the preemption implications
of these proposals for congressional action from both a policy and a
constitutional perspective?
BARNETT:

I refuse to answer, Senator, on the grounds that it may incriminate me. I really do not know that I have an answer except to say
that I am somewhat troubled by the trend to make private law mat4

5
6

Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. 1991).
280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. 1991) (rev. denied July 25, 1991).
Id.
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ters a matter of federal statute, which we see, for example, in the
tort reform movement. And that does not really go to the preemption question, but it does at least go to my reaction. As much as I
would like to see tort law reform and contract law reform at the local
level, I am troubled by federal legislation that would accomplish
that purpose.
OLSON:
Part of the answer to Randy's qualms is that changes injurisdiction and choice of law have unfortunately enabled states to impose
their forum and law on more and more transactions that belong in
part, often in predominant part, to other states. This in turn has
made it far easier for states to externalize the costs and internalize
the benefits of their litigation, getting money for their citizens at the
expense of citizens elsewhere. The lawsuits and the redistribution
of wealth are already interstate, and the reforms may have to be interstate as well, unless we can turn back the clock on jurisdiction and
choice of law.
QUESTION:
Mr. Olson, you present in your paper a number of outrageous,
if not humorous, cases. I wonder to what extent they are typical and
to what extent there were changes on appeal. This is a big country
and you can always find something of an oddity. Your cases are
reminiscent of those cited some years ago in the Aetna ads. I wrote
to Aetna for the citations of the cases that they had. Every one,
while it may have been costly for the parties, was reversed on
appeal.
OLSON:

I would not, in the first place, lightly brush aside the injustice of
subjecting someone to a wrongful suit simply because it does not
prevail in the end. It is cold comfort to win final vindication from a
lawsuit when you may have been absolutely ruined by the cost of
fighting it. Our legal system seems to congratulate itself over these
cases, like a doctor who pats himself on the back for finally getting
the diagnosis right although the process of taking biopsies killed the
patient.
In several of the cases I cited, there were settlements. Settlements are forever, so we know money was paid. Sometimes the settlement was after a jury verdict, sometimes before. I am relying on
newspaper accounts in the subway cases. I think they check out.
QUESTION:
Wally Olson suggested that there really is cause for gloom after
all. He suggested, I think rightly, that even if a few cases are coming
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out correctly, even if a lot of cases are coming out correctly, that this
is not the answer.
In extending from Justice Grodin's remarks about the need for
attorney's fees in the case of successful plaintiffs in certain kinds of
actions, does this suggest that there is a need for an expanded notion of the British rule on attorney's fees in the case of unsuccessful
plaintiffs?
GRODIN:

I think the question you raise is a legitimate one. It is one that I
have been concerned with a good deal. I was on a committee of the
state bar in California that was considering recommending something like the British rule, and we were on the verge of doing that
until we learned that in Britain there had been what was regarded as
very considerable reform to the rule. The reform was that plaintiffs
in consumer actions were exempt from liability for attorney's fees
on behalf of defendants. And that made us think that there are
problems with a legal situation in which someone is penalized or has
to incur substantial sanctions for bringing an action which is on the
verge of the law, which tests new principles of law, which is brought
in good faith and so forth. And I think there probably have to be
some exceptions for that.
I really am concerned, however, with the contracts situation. It
seems to me that a general principle of liability for attorney's fees
for the prevailing party is not a bad principle and that one of the
most egregious problems in the current situation is the case where
someone can say to a party to a contract: "Yeah, go sue, maybe I
owe you this money. But your lawyer is going to tell you that you
have to discount it by such an extent that you cannot afford to bring
the lawsuit." And that is not conducive to liberty or justice or anything else.
OLSON:

Two more points on the representativeness of cases and on the
legal system's role in determining injury. First, the actual decided
cases are just a small percentage. Most of the damage is being done
in negotiations and shakedowns. Second, the injury that we do not
hear enough complaints about from the trial lawyers is the injury
that litigation does to the opponent, guilty or innocent. This injury
is not exactly anecdotal. It tends to go on in every case-a 100 percent anecdote rate, if you please-and to be the routine and expected outcome of litigation in our courts.
QUESTION:

I have a two-part point to make to Professor Grodin and I
would like a response from Professor Barnett as well. I would like to
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know from Professor Grodin if he really believes that anyone has a
choice in the contracts and agreements he or she makes. It seems
from your remarks that you believe that the labor union member
does not participate in any sort of market for labor; that a person
choosing a hospital or an HMO does not really have any choice.
And I wonder if you really believe that the market does not exist
anywhere.
The second point that I have relates to some research, and I
only know it vaguely from remarks that Professor Allen Schwartz has
made at Yale. He has suggested that not every participant in a market must look at every single aspect of the choice that he or she
makes in order for the market to efficiently allocate resources. In
light of those findings, if you accept their validity, does not that reflect that only a few people have to choose the hospitals they enter,
or the cruise ships in which they embark in order for the market to
efficiently come up with the right exculpatory courses and the right
allocation of costs?
GRODIN:

Well, on the first question, I certainly do think that most contracts are the product of choice in the commercial arena. I agree
with Professor Farnsworth's distinction between the cruise ship and

the hospital. I think that while it is possible to talk about choice
among cruise ship operators with respect to choice of law provisions, I do not think that this is very meaningful. Certainly we can
talk about choice about whether one goes on a cruise ship or not
and I suppose it would not pain me if the rule were that if you go on
a cruise ship, you are stuck with whatever choice of law provision
appears on your ticket. I see a very substantial distinction between
that and the hospital situation. I do not think there is much of a
market-a real market-with respect to choice of hospitals and limitation of liability. I do not think it is realistic to talk about that. The
question then becomes where other things fit. For example, I think
that there is a lot of choice in a lot of employment relationships and
very little choice in others. We have to make decisions about the
operation of the labor market in general and we have to look at particular results. Efficiency is not everything. If the market produces a
situation in which workers are subjected to toxicity in the work
place, then that is a lousy market and we ought to do something
about it.
BARNE=t:

Obviously I take a different view of the matter. I think there is
far more choice in the market than Professor Grodin and people

who argue this position believe. The issue for them is not really
whether there is a choice or not. The issue is whether they can make
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a choice-based argument against contract in order to turn the underlying support of contract on its head. They make a choice-based
argument in order to bring about the death of contract, but they are
not really sincere in all cases in their concern about real choice.

